Self-custody security advisory

Tangem Laser Attack: What It Means for Self-Custody

A demonstrated physical attack changes what a lost card can mean. It is not a remote wallet hack, and the useful response is careful custody—not panic.

Published October 19, 2026; sources updated November 5, 2026. Sources: Ledger Donjon’s July 9, 2026 disclosure (named, not linked), The Block’s independent July 10 report, and Tangem’s July 9 response.

The finding, in plain language

Ledger Donjon reported an invasive laser fault-injection attack that resets a Tangem card’s access password without the old password or a backup card. After the reset, the attacker can use the card to sign transactions and spend its associated funds. This is an authentication bypass, not a demonstration of private-key extraction. It requires physical possession of a card, opening it to expose the chip, specialized laboratory equipment and substantial expertise; it is not a remote attack through a phone or the internet. [1] [2]

Donjon’s report says it reproduced the attack with password recovery disabled: disabling password recovery is not a mitigation for this finding. The researchers said all Tangem cards in circulation at disclosure were affected and that those cards cannot receive a firmware patch. That is their July 9 scope claim—not an independent certification of every later card or product. An app update is not a firmware repair for an affected card. [1] [2]

Expensive equipment does not mean that cost per card

Donjon put its laboratory setup at approximately $250,000. That is an equipment/setup figure, not a per-card attack price. Initial characterization took extensive work. Once the parameters were known for a given model, Donjon reported about two hours of preparation and exploitation per reproduction, on a second and third card. Those are the researchers’ reported results, not a success guarantee or an independent replication by this site. A residual risk of bricking the target card remains. [1] [2]

Tangem’s response emphasizes the physical access, specialist resources, preparation and destruction risk, and characterizes everyday practical risk as extremely low. In its July 9, 2026 response, Tangem also said there had been no known real-world losses from laser fault-injection attacks on any hardware wallet to date. That is a dated vendor claim, not proof that no unreported incident exists or that later losses are impossible. The disclosure itself is a laboratory demonstration, not evidence of a mass theft or remote breach. [3] [2]

Both vendors have commercial interests: Ledger sells competing wallets; Tangem sells the affected product. The demonstrated bypass should not be dismissed because of who reported it, nor should a lab result be inflated into a claim that every owner is being attacked. The two-hour repeat tests also matter when weighing Tangem’s emphasis on the initial setup effort.

What a card owner can do

  • Secure all linked cards, not just the one you use. Linked backup cards share access to the same wallet. This attack needs only one card, so a backup left somewhere accessible is not a harmless spare.
  • If any linked card is lost or stolen, treat it as potentially compromised. While you still have access through another card or your legitimate backup, move assets to a new, independently generated wallet whose keys are not shared with the missing card. Verify the destination and recovery method carefully; do not import the old seed and assume that makes a new wallet.
  • Changing the access password is insufficient. It does not change the underlying wallet keys or revoke a missing card’s signing capability. Disabling recovery likewise does not fix this bypass.
  • Do not create a second emergency. Use verified wallet software and your own trusted recovery procedure. Never enter a seed phrase into an advisory page, chat, unsolicited “support” form or supposed security-check website. This site does not need your keys.

If every card remains securely in your possession, this disclosure alone is not evidence that your funds have been taken. It is a reason to reassess physical custody and whether the device fits your threat model. There is no universally safe product, and this advisory is not a recommendation to buy a competing brand.

Sources and scope

  1. Ledger Donjon, “Bypassing Tangem Card Security with a Laser Attack,” July 9, 2026 — the original technical disclosure: findings, affected-card scope, patch limitation, laboratory cost and repeat-test results. Named but not linked: this site does not link to Ledger. Donjon disclosed the issue privately to Tangem in February 2026.
  2. The Block: Ledger researchers disclose Tangem card flaw; Tangem says risk to everyday users is ‘virtually non-existent’, July 10, 2026. Independent report of the disclosure, its scope and cost figures, and Tangem’s response.
  3. Tangem: Our Comment on Ledger Donjon’s Latest Article, July 9, 2026. The manufacturer’s response and its assessment of practical risk.

This is a source-based explanation, not our own hardware test or a live incident tracker. No purchase links or affiliate recommendations appear in this advisory.

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